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Staking Claims and Making 
Waves in the South China Sea: 
How Troubled Are the Waters?
ALICE D. BA
This article serves as an introduction to the South China Sea dispute, 
as well as the themes and challenges highlighted by articles in this 
special issue. It draws attention to the complexity of a dispute that 
is no longer just about territory but also broader maritime rights, an 
evolving maritime regime, resources, and increasingly, the role of China 
as a rising power in East Asia vis-à-vis the United States as the status 
quo power. It especially highlights how the intersection of US-China 
issues with what has historically been a regional dispute has signiﬁcantly 
raised the stakes for all concerned. It is the conclusion of contributing 
authors that mismanagement of the South China Sea will carry high, 
even unacceptable, costs.
Keywords: South China Sea, Spratly Islands, China, Southeast Asia, United 
States.
After a period of relative calm in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, the South 
China Sea dispute is back in the headlines. A long-running dispute, 
the South China Sea is now challenging regional relations in ways 
that it has not before. While the zero-sum nature of competing legal 
claims and perceived nationalist affronts associated with territorial 
disputes make them as a general category more challenging for those 
involved, the South China Sea can also be characterized as especially 
complex and difﬁcult. The cast of claimants is large and varied (six 
in all: China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei 
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— with Taiwan a non-state entity);1 the legal bases for claims are 
mixed; the economic stakes are great. Home to some of the busiest 
sea lanes in the world, more than a quarter of the world’s trade 
pass through the South China Sea each year. Upwards of 80 and 
90 per cent of Chinese and Japanese oil imports also traverse through 
these waters. A rich ﬁshing ground, the South China Sea is also 
an important resource for the local and national economies of the 
states involved. This is to say nothing of the potential hydrocarbon 
resources these waters are speculated to offer in an age of growing 
resource demand and scarcity.2 All these factors have long complicated 
states’ ability to resolve the dispute, but since 2008 the frequency of 
troubling confrontations between China and the other claimants has 
increased, as each tries to stake, defend and expand their physical 
claims via a range of activities. Of note have been efforts by China 
to detain and “expel” Vietnamese and Philippine ﬁshermen from 
disputed waters. Most serious have been a number of high-proﬁle 
exchanges (both diplomatic and naval) between China, the region’s 
rising power, and the United States, the region’s status quo power, 
over maritime rights. Such exchanges have elevated the dispute to 
a different level of geopolitical attention. While assessments about 
the likelihood of serious conﬂict vary, the historical characterization 
of these waters as being “dangerous ground”3 may be truer today 
than it has ever been in the past. 
The articles in this special issue on the South China Sea offer 
different perspectives on recent developments. Three of the articles 
(Goldstein, Thayer and Womack) were originally presented at the 2011 
International Studies Association’s annual conference in Montreal, 
where the panel was the subject of lively and engaged discussion. 
Originally, the panel also included Peter Dutton, whose paper was 
published elsewhere in the interim.4 Though we were sorry to lose 
Peter, we were fortunate to bring Taylor Fravel onboard in his 
place. This introduction serves to draw out some common themes 
and challenges highlighted by the authors and their implications 
for future developments. In particular, it highlights the various 
conﬂicts and tensions that have come to be intertwined with the 
South China Sea, pushing it to the foreground: conﬂicts over not 
just territory but also maritime rights and jurisdiction, resources, and 
increasingly, the relative inﬂuence of China and the United States 
as the region’s (and world’s) rising and status quo powers. It is the 
conclusion of the authors that mismanagement for all concerned, 
including non-claimants like the United States, will carry high 
— even unacceptable — costs. 
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The China Challenge
Among all the actors, China poses the largest challenge in both 
efforts to resolve and manage maritime and territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea and the tensions associated with them. This 
is not to say that other actors do not present their own challenges, 
but China nevertheless stands out as one particular problem. Reasons 
for this include the mixed bases of China’s claims (United Nations 
Law of the Sea or UNCLOS, historic rights and use, a U-shaped/
nine-dashed line map); the opaqueness and contradictions associated 
with China’s decision-making process; and perhaps, most of all, 
China’s growing power. While assessments vary in some notable 
ways, it is no coincidence that China factors large in each of the 
articles that follows. 
Of Law and Claims 
One factor that has complicated efforts to resolve the disputes regard 
the mixed bases on which states stake their claims.5 UNCLOS has 
also had mixed effects on the dispute. On the one hand, it provides 
a common legal framework and referent as all states involved in the 
South China Sea disputes are now signatories and base their claims 
either partly or entirely on it. This includes China, whose recent 
submissions to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) also make clear reference to UNCLOS 
as the basis for its claims.6 On the other hand, UNCLOS has also 
been a source of new claims, as well as a precipitating driver of 
disputes in recent years, as states seek to establish and consolidate 
their maritime holdings and jurisdictions under this relatively new 
maritime regime.7 
China’s claims are especially mixed, drawing on UNCLOS, but 
also historic rights and a 1947 map in which the South China Sea is 
delimited by nine dashes. Moreover, as authors in this issue detail, 
each of these bases is made more complicated by “ambiguities” 
contained within them. What constitutes “historic rights”? What 
exactly is included or claimed within those nine-dashes? Even 
China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and territorial sea claims 
under international law contain a question given that few of the 
Spratly land features constitute “islands” under UNCLOS.8 
The challenges associated with the ambiguities of both interna-
tional law and China’s claims are evident in recent developments. 
At least in part, the recent intensiﬁcation of disputes trace back 
to a UN deadline on the submission of continental shelf claims in 
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May 2009, at which time Malaysia and Vietnam made submissions 
to extend their continental shelves from 200 nautical miles to 350 
nautical miles into the South China Sea. That, in turn, prompted 
responses from both the Philippines and China, the latter of which 
responded with a note verbale. As Womack and Fravel note, neither 
the act of submitting the note nor even the wording contained in 
the note was that controversial in and of themselves.9 As Fravel 
puts it, if China believes in its claim (which it does), “international 
law demands that states actively maintain their claims, especially 
when challenged by other states”.10 Not to do so would have been 
tacit acknowledgement or recognition of their claims. Similarly, it 
is also not surprising that as interest in hydrocarbon exploration 
has increased, so too have China’s diplomatic objections. Womack 
further notes that the unresolved nature of disputes means that all 
sides are under some pressure to act as if their claims are legitimate 
— whether it is to ﬁsh, occupy, drill, survey or expel others for 
“trespassing”. Not to do so would not only be an implicit admis-
sion of another’s claim “and the abandonment of one’s own”, but 
also because such activities are themselves a basis to justify claims, 
states risk disadvantaging themselves in future negotiations and 
future efforts to resolve the issue. 
The problem in the recent exchange of UN submissions, 
however, was that China also attached a map — speciﬁcally, a 
contested nine-dashed line map where China appears to claim the 
South China Sea in its entirety.11 It also was apparently the ﬁrst 
time that the map was ofﬁcially submitted to the UN.12 The actual 
wording of the note verbale may be a relatively straightforward 
effort to counter others’ claims and submissions, but the attachment 
of the map, unexplained and without further elaboration, is not. In 
a sense, as Douglas Paal puts it, the map allows China to make a 
broader claim by implication, and that broader claim, at minimum, 
sits in tension with the relatively cautious approach (and more 
limited claims) of China’s past UNCLOS ﬁlings.13 The fact that (to 
quote Fravel in this issue) Beijing has been either “unwilling or 
unable” to clarify what exactly China includes or is referencing 
only aggravates the tension. One can draw one’s own conclusions 
— as both analysts and other claimants have — but the point is 
that China has not ofﬁcially done so. In both referencing the map 
and not clarifying it, Beijing has also created an opening for other 
Chinese-domestic actors to interpret for themselves and act based on 
those interpretations — actions and interpretations that may or may 
not be consistent with China’s ofﬁcial position or, at least, preferred 
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policy of its top leadership. As highlighted below and by authors 
in this issue, maritime issues provide particular examples of how 
different domestic actors are doing just that. The nine-dash line map 
had another effect as well — namely, it offered the opportunity, 
under the guise of international law, for the United States to engage 
in the dispute more actively.14 
A Question of Strategy
A particular challenge concerning China is also the lack of good 
information (and at times, contrary information) about the decision-
making processes. In this issue, two articles on China’s South 
China Sea strategy offer different insights into the thinking and 
priorities of China’s strategists. Taylor Fravel’s piece addresses the 
larger political calculus behind China’s recent actions and approach 
towards the South China Sea. Lyle Goldstein’s article sheds light on 
a critical actor in these disputes — namely, the Chinese military (and 
speciﬁcally the Chinese navy), which past analyses have identiﬁed 
as the source behind China’s hard line positions and push into the 
South China Sea. As Goldstein details, the Chinese military is an 
actor most assume a great deal about, but few in fact know very 
well. Filling in this important knowledge gap is critical for those 
seeking a better understanding of Chinese strategy. Goldstein’s piece 
offers an important effort towards this goal.
In particular, their articles respond to a perceived contradiction 
about China’s recent priorities and policies. A number of analysts 
examining recent tensions see a new Chinese assertiveness (for 
some “aggressiveness”) on the South China Sea that seem contrary 
to China’s political and security efforts of the last decade, namely, 
to convince the world and its neighbours of China’s “peaceful rise”. 
Analysts perceive recent actions posing a particular challenge to 
what most agree have been successful diplomatic and economic 
efforts in Southeast Asia, where relations, interests, and exchanges 
have signiﬁcantly grown.15 Undeniably, China’s recent statements on 
the South China Sea, administrative/regulatory actions, and patrol 
manoeuvres, as well as its nine-dashed map, jeopardize what have 
been hard-won gains. Stein Tønnesson expressed the views of many 
when he wrote, “It has been astounding to see the speed with 
which China could throw away the soft power it had managed to 
build in the region.”16 Of the articles that follow, Fravel’s piece 
most directly speaks to this perceived puzzle of Chinese foreign 
policy. In his article, he details how states pursuing territorial 
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claims have three strategic responses available to them (cooperation, 
escalation and delay). Of these three, China has opted mostly for 
the last — a strategy of delay and consolidation that is mostly a 
function of understood naval limitations. By this argument, periods 
of calm function as a way to “buy time” — time to consolidate 
one’s abilities, and time to consolidate one’s ability to hold onto 
the physical gains made.17 
To give emphasis to a strategy of delay is also to highlight the 
fact that China — though currently, the militarily advantaged claimant 
— also has the weakest physical claim. As Womack highlights, the 
importance of physical occupation to one’s legal claims and standing 
gives states incentives to expand their physical presence. China is 
no different. However, China has been disadvantaged — and it has 
been disadvantaged largely for the same reasons that its claims are 
seen as especially suspect by others, namely, the physical distance 
that separates China and Spratly land features. In fact, until 1988, 
China occupied no islands in the Spratly chain18 in contrast to the 
thirty or so insular features occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines 
and Malaysia. That situation fed into Chinese military views at 
the time that other claimants might be taking advantage of China’s 
military weakness and domestic distractions.19 The result was, as 
Fravel details, a strategy of escalation during the period between 1988 
and 1995, before returning once again to its predominant strategy of 
delay after 1995.20 By this view, the fact that South China Sea was 
less an issue during the 1995–2009 period — a period in which 
China-ASEAN relations experienced great improvement — was due 
to tactical, not substantive, shifts in China’s calculus vis-à-vis its 
Southeast Asian neighbours. During that period, delay served as a 
form of conﬂict management and damage control; it also provided 
time to consolidate gains. 
Fravel’s discussion also reminds us that this is not the ﬁrst 
time that contradictions have been observed in Chinese foreign 
policy relating to the South China Sea. Previous studies, focusing 
on different and speciﬁc actors, have tried to make sense of similar 
tensions in Chinese behaviour and policy. The period from 1988 
to 1995, for instance, exhibited similar contradictions between, on 
the one hand, China’s post-Tiananmen diplomatic efforts to make 
more regional friends along its periphery and, on the other, China’s 
legal and physical assertions — “escalation” by Fravel’s framework 
— in the South China Sea. This contradiction has been explained 
as a function of intra-bureaucratic politics, with the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) being the dominant actor.21 In the 
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years immediately after China’s 1989 Tiananmen crackdown on 
demonstrators, the military also enjoyed particular inﬂuence vis-à-
vis a more moderate Ministry of Foreign Affairs.22 As Goldstein in 
this issue details, this view of the military has become a piece of 
conventional wisdom. 
In Goldstein’s survey of recent navel opinion on the South China 
Sea, he challenges more than one accepted piece of conventional 
wisdom, beginning with assumptions about Chinese naval opinion 
and strategy. The Chinese military — perhaps like most militaries 
— is frequently portrayed as a uniﬁed actor, clear in its priorities 
and equally clear and calculating about the types of strategies to 
be pursued. Goldstein notes that the common “stereotypical view 
of the Chinese Navy” is that this is “a group inclined, whether by 
professional disposition, nationalist inclination, or bureaucratic self-
interest to favour aggressive naval expansion.”23 However, Goldstein 
draws attention to the fact that there is a greater range of opinion 
among those who work in military circles than commonly assumed. 
More familiar nationalist positions about the need to be vigilant 
against encroachment and violations by others sit alongside those 
that argue for restraint. Goldstein’s review of ofﬁcial direct statements 
by PLAN personnel, ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial naval journals and press, 
and elite academic circles reveals a “disturbing” trend towards 
“more hard-line assessments” but also at the same time, a “more 
complex picture” in which the “red lines” are more “ambiguous” 
than often portrayed. There remain, for example, signiﬁcant voices 
for moderation, especially among those who see the South China 
Sea disputes (and their associated challenges to both regional and 
US-China relations) as distracting to more important objectives. 
Goldstein’s attempt at ﬂeshing out these dissonances is an important 
contribution to the study of this issue. 
On the question of strategy, Taiwan and its relationship to 
China’s South China Sea agenda is raised by more than one author 
in this issue. In particular, authors highlight the challenges of 
attention associated with dealing with more than one conﬂict. Thus, 
as Goldstein details, one strain of Chinese naval strategic thinking 
expresses concern that “the rivalry over the South China Sea could 
derail Beijing’s strong strategic focus on the Taiwan issue”. By the 
same token, they see Vietnam advantaged in the South China Sea 
dispute because Vietnam, which no longer has the challenge or 
priority of reuniﬁcation, can single-mindedly focus on consolidating 
its South China Sea claims.24 Similarly, Womack highlights how 
Taiwan helps explain the recent intensiﬁcation of South China Sea 
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developments. Womack draws particular attention to the 2008 election 
of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, whose election freed not just 
China, but also the United States, to “think about somewhere else 
other than Taiwan.”25 
In addition to Taiwan, more moderate voices also raise concerns 
about how the South China Sea could detract from China’s larger 
priorities of economic and political development, which, as it turns 
out, commonly frame the commentaries on different ends of the 
spectrum. In other words, development — be it the need to secure 
sufﬁcient resources and military space to support that development 
or the diplomatic, political and economic support and room that 
is supportive of a larger comprehensive security and development 
agenda — provides moderates and non-moderates alike a common 
legitimating objective and justiﬁcation. Goldstein suggests that this 
is an important point because it matters what goals are considered 
legitimate and what is driving strategy. In this case, it is development 
(as opposed to territorial control, per se, or “hegemonic” control, 
for example) that is the driving end-goal even for those advocating 
a more activist naval approach towards the South China Sea. This 
development justiﬁcation will likely continue to shape and constrain 
what Goldstein describes as the ongoing “struggle over policy in the 
South China Sea between hawks and doves”. 
In highlighting the range of opinion that exists in Chinese naval 
strategic debates, Goldstein’s article, at minimum, speaks to the 
complexity of China’s decision-making environment, a complexity 
that is also noted by others working in other areas of Chinese 
foreign policy.26 That environment is characterized by different (even 
a growing diversity of) domestic actors and agencies that can work 
at cross-purposes and not always with authorization from China’s 
central leadership. The South China Sea and maritime affairs, more 
generally, in fact offer more than one example of the difﬁculties 
of assuming too much about the coherence of Chinese maritime 
strategy. Ian Storey, for example, has previously drawn attention to 
the speciﬁc case of Mischief Reef on which Chinese structures were 
built in 1994 and discovered in 1995, precipitating the last South 
China Sea crisis in China-ASEAN relations before more recent events. 
Such structures were apparently not authorized by the Chinese 
leadership but were instead put there independently by the PLAN.27 
More recent examples draw attention to local and provincial-level 
politics as in the case of the so-called “Malacca dilemma”. In that 
case, Yunnan ofﬁcials and academics apparently played up the issue 
of China’s energy security in the interest of building a pipeline to 
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Myanmar.28 The East China Sea offers a similar but different example 
— in this case of local and provincial administrative agencies 
independently encouraging Chinese ﬁshermen to ﬁsh further out 
into the East China Sea. This, of course, increased the likelihood 
of direct confrontation with Japan, which was what happened in 
2010 when Chinese ﬁshermen collided with and were then arrested 
by the Japanese Coast Guard, precipitating a crisis in China-Japan 
relations.29 Such tensions and crises of regional relations have been 
serious enough that China’s leadership is now apparently looking 
into the creation of a higher-level coordinating or advisory unit on 
maritime affairs, possibly above ministry level, to help reconcile 
such tensions and avert future crises.30 Such actions would also be 
consistent with Fravel’s discussion of the “pressure from above to 
harmonize actions with the requirements of Chinese diplomacy”, 
and efforts by top leaders to “unify thought” on the issue.
All this is not to say that China’s South China Sea approach is 
completely without direction. As noted above and by authors here, 
there are larger goals driving policy. Other analysts like Michael 
Swaine, for example, have argued that China’s leaders have “enunciated 
and are pursuing a clear, coherent, and largely consistent set of 
national objectives and priorities” that include “the maintenance 
of internal order and stability; the sustainment of high levels of 
growth and prosperity in order to create a ‘well-off society’ and thus 
facilitate the revival of the nation by the middle of this century; 
the protection of the country against foreign and domestic threats to 
both territory and sovereignty; and the eventual achievement of great 
power status in Asia and beyond”.31 Thus, the question appears not 
to be the “what” (what are the ultimate driving objectives) but the 
“how” (how does China ensure that those objectives are achieved), 
and as authors in this issue highlight, the answer to that is one 
that is always in process, conditioned by shifting power equations 
but also by the dynamic domestic and international environments 
of which China and its decision-makers are a part.
What’s at Stake? 
China-Southeast Asia Relations 
Not surprisingly, discussions on the South China Sea draw particular 
attention to the implications of China’s rise for Southeast Asia. 
Certainly, from the vantage point of China’s weaker Southeast Asian 
neighbours (claimants and non-claimants alike), the expansiveness of 
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China’s claims — the fact that it claims so much of the waters near 
their coasts — is disturbing, especially given China’s growing military 
capabilities. Recent difﬁculties in relations are also a reminder of the 
fact that recent improvements in China-Southeast Asia relations are 
exactly that — recent — and that diplomatic credibility (let alone 
trust) remains to be achieved (on both sides). Indeed, as much as 
China-Southeast Asia relations have improved in recent years, China’s 
recent South China Sea actions, along with its refusal to clarify its 
claims, play into Southeast Asian questions about Chinese intentions 
and especially states’ underlying fears that China is pursuing exactly 
what Fravel in this issue highlights — namely, a strategy of delay 
that will then be put to the wayside once China has the capacities 
to do so. As Womack puts it in his article, the South China Sea 
has become the material symbol of Southeast Asian uncertainties 
and insecurities vis-à-vis China. China’s power is growing and in a 
situation of growing asymmetry, reassurance will require more than 
the logic of mutual gains (“win-win”).32 
Carl Thayer similarly speaks to the difficulties involved in 
managing relations between larger and smaller powers but with 
special attention to Vietnam’s predicament. If Goldstein’s article 
highlights Chinese concerns about Vietnam taking advantage of China’s 
weaknesses and distractions, Thayer gives attention to Vietnam’s 
concerns about autonomy vis-à-vis its larger neighbour. In particular, 
Thayer details a series of Chinese actions that have renewed and 
intensiﬁed Vietnam’s defence of its claims. Drawing on Womack’s 
theory of asymmetry, Thayer examines China-Vietnam relations with 
reference to the general “structure of persistent asymmetry” that 
Vietnam’s leaders must negotiate when dealing with its large and 
inﬂuential neighbour to the north. While a structure of asymmetry 
informs relations between all the Southeast Asian claimants and 
China, it is Vietnam for which the structure is most pronounced and 
acute. Of Southeast Asian claimants, Vietnam is the one most likely 
to ﬁnd itself in a conﬂict situation with China. This is partly due to 
proximity and a common border — “the tyranny of geography” — 
and the additional problem of the Paracel Islands, which China has 
controlled since 1974. It is also partly due to the particular sensitivity 
of the relationship that requires more active and self-conscious efforts 
by both sides (China and Vietnam) to be sensitive to the needs of 
the other. Not surprisingly, this is the relationship for which the 
South China Sea has also proven to be the most challenging. Twice, 
the disputes have been the cause for military confrontations between 
China and Vietnam, where the latter lost ground. In 1974 Vietnam 
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lost the Paracels. In 1988 military confrontations resulted in over 
seventy Vietnamese casualties and a new Chinese physical presence in 
the South China Sea (where China occupied six previously vacant 
islets). Recent South China Sea exchanges once again feature the 
China-Vietnam relationship prominently. As articles in this issue 
highlight, 2009 and 2010 proved especially busy years in terms of 
the number of Chinese expulsions and detentions of Vietnamese 
ﬁshermen, especially in waters near the Paracels, due to a combined 
increase of both Vietnamese ﬁshing activity and Chinese regulatory/
administrative attention. 
As Thayer highlights, the resultant “souring of relations”, as 
well as the potential for conﬂict more serious than what in fact 
took place in 2009–10, speak to the special difﬁculties involved in 
maintaining this particular China-Southeast Asian relationship. The fact 
that greater conﬂict did not take place, argues Thayer, is indicative 
of the “mature asymmetry” that now characterizes the relationship. 
Deﬁned by, above all, a mutual recognition and mutual appreciation 
for the other’s needs, mature asymmetry requires obligations from 
each side — an obligation from Vietnam (the lesser power) to exhibit 
deference to China (the larger power) and a reciprocating obligation 
from China to respect the interests and autonomy of Vietnam, its 
weaker neighbour.33 Further, such relationships of mature asymmetry 
are critically not imposed, but ones that are carefully and self-
consciously negotiated; they are based also on mutual recognition 
of one’s own limitations vis-à-vis the other. To quote Womack, the 
stability of the relationship is contingent on there being a modus 
vivendi, as opposed to a modus dominandi. 34 Mutual accommodations 
are thus critical. Maturity in relations will also be undergirded by a 
recognition of opportunity and beneﬁt (as opposed to simply costs) 
that also supports expanded and institutionalized exchanges that 
underlies the ongoing “normalcy” of relations.35 Noting that 2011 has 
returned relations to relative “normalcy”, Thayer concludes that the 
China-Vietnam relationship will require work and continued sensitivity 
on both sides about the other’s concerns but that ultimately, there is 
also a mix of mechanisms and “methods” in place36 that help guard 
against a return to a relationship of more “hostile asymmetry”. 
Thayer’s conclusion also speaks to the fact that China’s relations 
with Southeast Asia (and also the world in general) are much more 
extensive compared to, for example, the early-mid 1990s when the 
South China Sea was last a major issue. Put another way, recent 
commentary to the contrary, China’s regional engagement cannot 
be reduced to this one issue, and Chinese diplomacy of the last 
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decade was not all for naught. At minimum, ten years of mutual 
engagement have put in place a range of mechanisms and interests 
that serve to buffer and mediate speciﬁc tensions, in addition to 
keeping opportunities on the table. Nevertheless, China’s relations 
with Southeast Asian states are, as highlighted, challenged by events. 
The expansiveness of China’s claim, especially with reference to 
“historic waters” and historic claims, suggest a sense of regional 
entitlement that sit in tension with the message China has been 
trying to convey through what has otherwise been China’s successful 
regional diplomacy. These tensions have to be reconciled and addressed 
if the South China Sea is not to remain the primary contradiction 
and “Achilles heel” (to use Kavi Chongkittavorn’s characterization) 
in China-Southeast Asian relations.37 
Recognition of this contradiction is why Womack argues that 
China needs to be much more clear about specifying the “parameters” 
of its behaviour. Others like Li Mingjiang further suggest that China 
shift the basis of its Spratly claim. Rather than territorial or historic 
waters based on the nine-dashed line map, China could claim instead 
the Spratlys as a line of islands and other land features covered by 
UNCLOS.38 Such a claim would still compete with others’ claims 
but it would, as Patrick Cronin notes, have “the beneﬁt of limiting 
suspicions that China’s core interests are expanding”.39 It would 
also counter concerns that China approaches Southeast Asia with a 
sense of historical entitlement. In addition, it might be seen as an 
instance of reciprocation, with similarities to the Philippines’ 2009 
decision to claim the Spratlys as a “a regime of islands under the 
Republic of the Philippines” (instead of claiming them within the 
Philippine baseline) in response to Chinese pressure.40 
US-China Relations in Southeast Asia and Beyond
Given that the South China Sea has previously waxed and waned 
in prominence, it may be tempting to conclude that not much has 
changed about this dispute. The signiﬁcance of the South China Sea 
has, however, grown larger — and that is due to two related changes 
and developments. As Womack points out, the developments are China’s 
growing capabilities and (not coincidentally) the active interest of the 
United States in the dispute. On the ﬁrst point, Goldstein echoes some 
of the themes in Fravel’s discussion, especially how Chinese strategic 
thinking on the issue of the South China Sea has long reﬂected a 
view of its own weakness and disadvantage vis-à-vis other claimants. 
However, while “China’s Navy has been weak for decades”, China’s 
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new “strength is clearly a new dimension of the equation, both for 
external observers and Chinese strategists alike”.41 
Of the authors here, Womack and Goldstein are most explicit 
in characterizing US-China questions as fundamentally intertwined 
with recent South China Sea developments and their respective 
relations with Southeast Asian states. Much recent analyses focuses on 
perceived changes in China’s position and approach — conventional 
wisdoms that Goldstein challenges and qualiﬁes — but what is of 
at least equal signiﬁcance is the United States’ active interest in 
the disputes. While America’s principled position remains mostly 
the same — it maintains and will defend its strong national interest 
in freedom of the sea lanes — there have been changes in the US 
attention to, and interest in actively engaging, the dispute that 
introduce new and different dynamics to a dispute that has until 
now been mostly limited to Asian claimants. In fact, the United 
States had previously avoided getting involved even in the face 
of direct appeals from the Philippines. Why now? Womack argues 
that much is due to the relative power of China and, in particular, 
“changes in the big picture of regional and global relations since 
the beginning of the global crisis of economic uncertainty” that 
began in 2008. That crisis simultaneously increased the gap between 
China and the Southeast Asian states and decreased the gap between 
China and the United States. While China’s pre-2008 growth was 
already quite strong, the global crisis nevertheless had the effect 
of intensifying US fears and insecurities about ongoing strategic 
trends and a soon-to-be situation of “strategic stalemate” between 
the United States and China “on China’s maritime perimeter”. 
The combined developments of economic crisis, Chinese military 
modernization, as well as Taiwan’s election of Ma Ying-jeou, make 
2008, for Womack, “a watershed year” as regards US interest in 
the South China Sea.
US concerns regarding the shifting power equation were reinforced 
in 2009. In March 2009 the USN Impeccable came into conﬂict 
with Chinese patrol boats 120 km off the coast of Hainan Island 
in what other analysts have identiﬁed as an especially signiﬁcant 
event where US strategic thinking and interest in the South China 
Sea dispute is concerned.42 In May 2009 South China Sea claimants 
ﬁled their UN claims and counter-claims, one of which included 
China’s nine-dashed map. As Womack puts it, “At this point the 
strategic worries of South East Asia overlap with quite different 
concerns of the United States”, with the expansiveness of China’s 
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claim a common focus. Douglas Paal has suggested that the United 
States had no choice but to involve itself in the South China Sea 
dispute if it did not wish to see a decline in regional inﬂuence.43 
But in responding to China’s claims, the United States justiﬁed its 
intervention based on what some see as an expansive claim of its 
own — that is, its historic defence of “freedom of navigation”. For 
those in the US who worry about sea access (and denial), they cite 
the 2007 US Maritime Strategy that “proclaims the US Navy will 
preserve its capacity to ‘impose local sea control wherever necessary, 
ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we 
must’”.44 However, a number of analysts, including Womack here, see 
the US’s concern about “freedom of navigation” as exaggerated, more 
a legal cover for defending its maritime position and inﬂuence in 
Asia. At minimum, the US seeks to preserve its ability to continue 
surveillance activities (as in the case of the USN Impeccable).45 In 
other words, the issue is less freedom of navigation in the sense 
of unhindered passage through the South China Sea — e.g., with 
trade, energy resources, etc. (something that is difﬁcult to see China 
wanting to block given its own reliance on critical sea lanes in the 
South China Sea and elsewhere) — but instead, the fact that the 
United States stops to poke around. It is worth noting also that in 
addition to China, other states — including Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and India (which, like China, has also objected to speciﬁc incidents 
of US surveillance though it did not operationally interfere) and 
others46 — have also expressed their objection to what they see to 
be an expansive interpretation of what activities are included under 
“freedom of navigation” on the part of the United States.47 The fact 
that the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS yet calls on 
others to abide by international law also tends to undermine the US 
position among those who oppose its interpretations of UNCLOS. 
Nevertheless, the overlap of US concerns about the legality of 
foreign surveillance activities in EEZs and Southeast Asian states’ 
different territorial and maritime jurisdictional concerns provided the 
opening for the United States to multilateralize and thus legitimate 
its speciﬁc strategic concerns through existing regional mechanisms 
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), as it did in 2010. The fact that 
Hanoi was chair of ASEAN in 2010 may have been a coincidence, 
but Vietnam’s own interest in internationalizing the dispute (as 
highlighted by Thayer) likely facilitated US efforts towards the same. 
Especially in the context of the last decade’s general improvement 
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in China-Southeast Asian relations (over which there has been much 
fretting in the United States), Washington’s ability to work with 
ASEAN states could also be seen as both pushback and a desired 
(and perhaps, needed) afﬁrmation of its own position. At minimum, 
it has reinforced the Obama administration’s general message to Asia 
since assuming ofﬁce, namely, that “the US is back”.48 
Unquestionably, US involvement has upped the stakes for 
China — but with possibly mixed effects for the dispute at hand. 
By one argument, Washington’s intervention has been very effective. 
Certainly, this is the general view of those based in the United 
States. Washington, with support from key regional states, drew a 
clear line. More importantly, it “called out” China, which has in 
essence been trying to have it both ways (in its consolidation and 
continued defense of its vast South China Sea claims without harm 
to its ASEAN relations). The US intervention also provided new 
impetus for rejuvenating China and ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and the 2011 
agreement on guidelines for its implementation. 
At the same time, developments, especially from 2010, also 
suggest that US diplomatic intervention is not without some cost. For 
one, developments potentially have damaged what may be ASEAN’s 
greatest resource — namely, its neutrality. While one can question 
the speciﬁc utilities of ASEAN in this dispute, the reputation of the 
organization nevertheless matters to how China prioritizes its regional 
relations (over, for example, narrower territorial gains). At minimum, 
actions taken at the ARF could be seen as conﬁrming China’s original 
fears and insecurities when it ﬁrst began participating in ASEAN-
arrangements nearly twenty years ago, namely, that others would 
use those mechanisms to “gang up” on China. Such developments 
also encourage minority views in China that China-ASEAN relations 
need reassessment. Put another way, South China Sea developments 
have bruised not just ASEAN states’ views of China, but also some 
Chinese views of ASEAN. Goldstein notes that some of China’s more 
belligerent commentary on the South China Sea, including some 
comments from those who have historically been more moderate, 
took place following Hillary Clinton’s remarks at the ARF meeting 
in Hanoi in July 2010, which Goldstein has characterized as “a 
catalytic moment”.49 
For another, Goldstein notes that the US entrance into the South 
China Sea dispute has also been at cost to US-China relations, making 
those relations “signiﬁcantly worse than they could be”. Goldstein 
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cites new strains between the two countries in Southeast Asia, as 
well as the Yellow and East China Seas. In the speciﬁc case of 
the South China Sea, US-China exchanges during 2010 and even 
2011 provide examples of exaggerated charges and overreactions, 
including the “he said; she said” moment about whether or not 
Chinese ofﬁcials in fact identiﬁed the South China Sea as a “core 
interest” in March 2010.50 As Womack details, the allegation by 
US ofﬁcials, including Hillary Clinton, that Chinese ofﬁcials had 
identiﬁed the South China Sea as a “core interest”, along with the 
nine-dashed map, was an important factor contributing to the recent 
intensiﬁcation of Southeast Asian insecurities. 
Among the authors here, Goldstein gives greatest attention to 
the concept of “core interest”. He argues that analysts (typically 
American) use the “core interest” question in ways that tend to 
exaggerate the extent to which China’s South China Sea policy has 
changed or been militarized. Meanwhile, Chinese commentary can 
also overreact to US statements and involvement in ways that feed 
into more China-wary views in the United States. In this sense, 
the much debated “core interest” comment can also be seen as a 
product of increasingly fraught US-China exchanges over the course 
of 2009 and 2010, exchanges made worse by the fact that contact 
between the two militaries had been broken.51 Goldstein’s contribution 
is probably the most concerned about the trends in US-China 
relations and strategic thinking, with the South China Sea having 
emerged as “one of the most difﬁcult areas of US-China relations”, 
overshadowing other notable efforts by China to play constructive 
regional and global roles. 
The US-China dynamics currently playing out in the South 
China Sea also speak to some of the same challenges of managing 
asymmetric relations in the China-Vietnam case — albeit, here, 
the relationship is playing out under conditions of lessening, not 
growing, asymmetry. Both sides fail to appreciate sufﬁciently the 
other’s concerns: in the US case, its concerns about denial of access, 
marginalization from East Asia, and challenges to its privileged 
maritime position (this is new territory for the United States); and 
in China’s case, its fears that the United States will derail its growth 
(and thus stability) and deny it important international recognition. 
Ultimately, both sides share a burden for shaping the trajectory of 
their relations and more broadly, the nature of “China’s rise”. Too 
much of the recent commentary on the South China Sea overly 
focuses on China — What did it say? What has it done? What did 
it mean? — as if China were an actor making decisions independent 
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of those around it, when in fact its policies and strategic assessments 
are dynamic as it responds to the actions of others. Both Goldstein’s 
tracing of naval assessments and his concluding caveats about US 
assessments of China and US policy speak to these points. 
There is an argument to be made that just as much as lesser 
powers in conditions of great asymmetry demand reassurance, 
so too do rising ones that their security interests, and desire for 
recognition can be achieved within the existing structure of relations 
and international arrangements. The onus here, then, is on the larger 
power to provide that reassurance. Womack notes that especially 
in a situation of diminishing asymmetry, “the United States will 
be forced to treat China with respect or else it will make unhappy 
discoveries about the limits of its own power”. The challenge, 
of course, is that the United States also has concerns and 
questions — of both the global order type and more narrowly self-
interested ones about its own relative inﬂuence. Thus, openness and 
restraint are also required on China’s part — a willingness to clarify 
ambiguities in its position, a commitment to keep talking despite 
differences, and an effort to guard against both overstatement and 
overreaction. Again, it will take effort on both sides if US-China 
differences on the South China Sea are not to spill over into 
other areas or transform relations into the new “Cold War” that 
some Chinese analysts highlighted in the Goldstein piece fear/
anticipate. 
Conclusion 
To varying degrees, authors in this issue generally agree that conﬂict 
can be avoided and that there are spaces for potential compromise. 
Fravel, for example, cites historical precedents where China has 
been willing to make territorial compromises in support of larger 
strategic and political objectives; he also sees opportunities in China’s 
exclusion of the Spratlys from its drawing of its baselines.52 Goldstein 
draws attention to the concern for moderation and compromise 
from China’s senior leadership, as well as key naval higher-ups; 
Thayer highlights the mechanisms and interests that exist to counter 
more emotional and violent reactions. Womack, along with Fravel 
and Thayer, sees China and ASEAN states’ 2011 agreement and 
attention to implementing the DoC as a signiﬁcant recognition by 
states of the need to reduce tensions, especially as it involved 
critical and symbolic concessions, especially on the parts of China 
and Vietnam. Much like the original DoC, the 2011 agreement and 
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states’ ability to overcome their stalemate expressed a common 
interest to ratchet down the dispute from where it was in 2009 
and 2010. While acknowledging the need for “bolder” measures, 
Womack sees the DoC as both “reasonable” and “promising” as a 
framework that moreover can provide the basis for “a more robust 
Spratly Management Authority”. 
Most of all, authors mostly see the prospects for major 
conﬂict being mitigated by an unfavourable cost-beneﬁt calculus 
where the costs of conﬂict and militarization will be high and 
the benefits far from clear. Certainly, this is true of Southeast 
Asia’s weaker states, but it is also true of the major powers — China 
and the United States. For China, for example, Womack is strongest 
in seeing militarization of the dispute as contrary to China’s 
“quarter century of broad and peaceful development” and reform-
era policies and diplomacy that have served it very well. A South 
China Sea conﬂict scenario would also likely have ripple effects 
along China’s periphery among other neighbouring and lesser states 
that are most vulnerable to Chinese power. Given the attention 
and priority that has been given to stabilizing China’s periphery 
these past two decades, it hardly seems in China’s interest to 
militarize the South China Sea in such a way that invites more 
active interventions from others in the seas around it, especially 
given its own reliance on those waters to get goods in and out. 
At minimum, militarization would divert resources and attention 
from both domestic and other global objectives, with active defence 
of claims requiring “diplomatic and military efforts of the utmost 
magnitude”.53 Womack is blunt in his argument that the Spratlys, 
in the larger scheme of Chinese objectives, is insigniﬁcant: “[T]here 
is no threshold of military superiority that would make it beneﬁcial 
for China to establish its control over all the Spratlys at the cost 
of strategic hostility with Southeast Asia.” By one argument, China 
has the most to lose with the militarization of the South China 
Sea dispute. 
As for the United States, Goldstein is most direct in considering 
the risks and costs of US involvement. Much as is the case in 
his discussion on US assessments of China, Goldstein’s concern 
is that too much is assumed of US power and attraction, and too 
much weight has already been placed on a dispute that is not that 
important to US larger interests or global balance of power. As 
already noted, Washington’s diplomatic intervention has already been 
at cost to US-China relations in other areas. US-China tensions also 
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potentially push away Southeast Asian states who fear great power 
conﬂict more than they want the US to balance China.54 Most of 
all, Goldstein warns the United States against “competing for the 
sake of competing” and to guard against over-involving itself in a 
conﬂict that risks US credibility, if not lives (as it did forty years 
ago in Vietnam). 
At the same time, though authors generally conclude that the 
prospect for major conflict will be mitigated by the high costs 
involved, they also all raise concerns about the possibility of 
inadvertent conﬂict. US-China conﬂict that would make Southeast 
Asia once again a site of great power conﬂict is a particular concern, 
especially for Goldstein whose analysis of Chinese strategic thinking 
suggests a narrowing moment of opportunity for the United States 
and China to ensure more moderate voices (which thus far have 
been dominant) prevail. To end (and begin) on a Womack theme, 
the dangers of South China Sea waters have long been known, but 
whether today’s strategists and decision-makers will be able to avoid 
the dangerous ground of the Spratlys as they have historically done 
remains an open question. It is to the factors and dynamics shaping 
this question that these articles now turn.
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